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STATEMENT Q£ IHE ISSUES 
EfllMI 1- JMFIgOICTIQN QF IHE. STATE TAX COMMISSI ON 
CI) Does UCA S3-14A, The Individual Income Tax Act 
of 1373, create a ''direct tax** which can be levied 
on persons and property because of their 
existence, or does it create an " indirect excise 
tax" which is only levied on priviledged activitu? 
CS) When enforcing the income tax, does the State 
Tax Commission have Jurisdiction over 
"nontaxpayers", those not involved in priviledged 
activity; or are they restricted to "taxpayers", 
persons involved in activities or event which are 
taxable for revenue purposes? 
C3) When Jurisdiction is challenged on an "income 
tax" issue, must the State Tax Commission prove 
that the dependent was involved in some 
'activity', 'event', 'occasion', or 'incident' 
which is taxable under the provisions of UCA 
59-14A in order to obtain proper jurisdiction? 
EQML JUL- UALIDITY QF Hi£ SUBPOENA 
CD Does UCA 53-5-46(173 auortharize State Tax 
Commission special agents to issue subpoenas for 
witnesses, or does it restrict that power to the 
Commission only? 
(23 When UCA 53-5-46(173 grants the Commission 
Power to subpoena "witnesses", does said term 
encompass persons who are the object of, or the 
putative defendent in the investigation? 
(33 Does the State Tax Commission pursuant to UCA 
59-5-46(173 have more extensive subpoena powers 
than are granted to Judicial proceedings, or are 
they restricted by the same safeguards as are the 
courts? 
ffilfii ILL- JURISDICTION QF jug. J&& COURT 
CD Does UCA 59HB4-1, which creates the Tax Court 
Division of the Judicial Districts, grant general 
Jurisdiction, or only ''exclusive" jurisdiction of 
all appeals from and petitions for review of 
decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the Commission", to 
the Tax Court? 
CE?) When a District Court Judge sits as the 
District's "Tax Court Judge", is he limited to the 
jurisdictional scope of the "Tax Court" ? 
C3) Can the Tax Court, created by UCA 5S-£li-l, 
assume jurisdiction over a case before the State 
Tax Commission has conducted "formal hearings", 
and "rendered" any decisions pursuant to the 
evidence presented at said "formal hearings"? 
ILL 
STftTLlTQRY FRQUISIONS 
Chapter 5: State Tax Commission 
Section 46:General Powers and Duties 
Subsection (17): 
(17) to examine all records, books, papers, and 
documents relating to the valuation of property of 
any corporation or individual, and to subpoena 
witnesses to appear and give testimony and to 
produce records,books, papers, and documents 
relating to any matter which the commission has 
authority to investigate or determine. The 
commission or any party may in any investigation 
cause depositions of witnesses to be taken as in 
civil actions. Any member of the State Tax 
Commission, its secretary, and such other officers 
or employees as the commission may designate, may 
administer oaths and affirmations in any matter or 
proceeding relating to the exercise of the powers 
and duties of the commission; 
Chapter 14A: Individual Income Tax Act of 1973 
Section 2: Declaration of intent. 
The intent of the legislature in the enactment 
of this act, is to accomplish the following 
objective: 
(a) To impose on each resident individual, 
estate or trust for each taxable year a tax 
measured by the amount of his "taxable income: for 
such year, as determined for federal income tax 
purposes, subject to certain adjustments; and 
(d) To conform to the extent practicable, 
certain of the existing rules of procedure under 
and for the administration of the Utah individual 
income tax law to corresponding or apposite rules 
of administration and procedure prescribed by the 
federal income tax laws, with a view to reduction 
of duplication of effort, promotion of better 
understanding of requirements, and greater 
consistency between state and federal procedure 
and administration. 
Section 4: Definitions. 
Cc)The term "taxpayer" means any individual, 
estate, or trust or beneficiary thereof, whose 
Income is subject in whole or part to the tax 
imposed by this act. 
Section 11: State taxable income of resident 
individual. 
The term $*state taxable income" in the case of a 
resident individual means his federal taxable 
income with the modifications, subtractions and 
adjustments provided in section 59-14A-13. For 
definition of state taxable income of a resident 
estate or trust, see sectionS9-14A~B7. 
Section 8.1: Taxable years, 
Ca) For purposes of the tax imposed by this act, 
a taxpayer's taxable year shall be the same as his 
taxable year for federal income tax purposes. 
Title 5S, Chapter 24: Tax Court Act. 
Section 1: 
CI) There is created a tax division in each of 
the district courts of the state of Utah which 
shall have exclusive Jurisdiction of all appeals 
from and petitions for review of decisions by the 
state tax commission rendered after formal 
hearings before the commission. 
UieU Etthm QL ELliilL PROCEDURE 
Rule 45. Subpoena 
Section Cd3: Subpoena for Taking Deposition; Place 
of examination. 
C2) A resident of the state may be required to 
attend an examination only in the county wherein 
he resides or is employed or transacts his 
business in person, or at such other convenient 
place as is fixed by an order of the court. A 
nonresident of the state may be required to attend 
only in the county in this state wherein he is 
served with a subpoena, or within 40 miles from 
the place of service, or at such other convenient 
place as is fixed by an order of the court. 
U M U M STATES CJQUEL 
TITLE E6 
Section 1313 
Cb) Notwithstanding section 7701CaK143, the term 
taxpayer means any person subject to a tax under 
the applicable revenue laws. 
LU1IIE3I SI&IE& CONSTITUTION 
Sixteenth Amendment 
The congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several states, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
in 
Siai£0££il Q£ XH£CaS£L 
NBIUES, Q£ UtLE. CaS£ 
This is a civil case, brought by the State Tax 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SIC) as an 
origional action in the Tax Court based on the alLegations 
that Appellant, Mr. Iverson, is a taxpayer uiithin the 
jurisdictional relm of the STC, is liable for an income tax 
for the years 1983-1984, has a duty to obey an administrative 
subpoena, pursuant to UCft 59-5-46(17 3, seeking information 
concerning assets with which to satisfy said alledged 
liability and the collection thereof, and has not fulfilled 
said duty for which sanction of a 30 day jail sentence was 
imposed pursuant to a contempt ruling by the Tax Court Judge 
of the Third Judicial District. 
fir, Iverson timely denied all of said allegations, 
specifically declaring that h^ is not a taxpayer, thereby 
challenging the jurisdiction of both the STC and the Tax 
Courtf and has consistently demanded all of his inalienable 
rights as guaranteed in the organic laws of the United 
States. In addition he challenged the validity and accuracy 
of the Notice of Deficiency upon which the alindge tax 
liability uias based and pursuant to wnich the administrative 
subpoena was issued. The validity of the subpoena itself was 
challenged as being improperly issued and therefore void. 
COURSE flL IHL FTOCEEPINgg 
The course c:f these proceedings technically begin at the 
administrative level on August 14, 1985 when the STC served a 
'Notice of Deficiency' for the years 1383-1984, on Mr. 
Iverson claiming an income tax liability with iterest, and 
penalties due. Mr. Iverson responded by contesting the 
Jurisdiction of the STC explaining that he is not a taxpayer 
and as such was not liable for any tax, and could not avail 
himself of procedures established for taxpayers only, such as 
filing Petitions for Redetermination. He did however demand a 
'Prior Hearing* and after some hesitation on the part of the 
STC Compliance Officer, a 'meeting* mas scheduled for 
September SO, 1985. Said 'meeting' mas subsequently canceled 
with the explanation that "...you CMr.Iverson) have had ample 
opportunity to ask questions... there is no more for us to 
discuss." The STC continued foretuard with their proceedure as 
if Mr. Iverson were a taxpayerf finalizing their audit 
deficiency, recording warrents at the county recorder's 
office, and moving into collection; all without holding any 
prior, formal, informal or other type of public hearing to 
take evidence and determine if fir. Iverson was indeed a 
taxpayer. 
A Subpoena Duces Tecum was issued by the Commissioners 
on March El, 19BB commanding Mr, Iverson to appear on 10 
April, 1986 at the private offices of the STC in Salt Lake 
City, to be deposed and produce records. This Subpoena was 
not delivered to Mr. Iverson until after the date set certain 
for the deposition; he was therefore unable to attend. 
An STC Compliance Officer, realizing her error in 
service, altered the First subpoena, and had the altered 
document personally served on Mr. Iverson in Garrison Utah. 
Mr. Iverson, recognizing this second document as an 
unauthorized alteration; and still challenging STC 
jurisdiction inFormed the commission by mail that he would 
not be in attendance* At this point the STC commenced 
judicial proceedings by filing an origional civil action with 
the Tax Court of the Third Judicial District. Said action was 
commenced with a UERIFIED PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, 
which was granted. 
Mr. Iverson was served in Garrison, Utah with the ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE, commanding his appearance on may 19,1986 
before the above-mentioned court; which he did. Rather than 
being given opportunity to 'show cause' why he had not obeyed 
the purported subpoena, Mr. Iverson was coerced onto the 
witness stand to supply the evidence the STC wanted to 
convict him. Mr. Iverson objected strongly, but took the 
stand, after threats of contempt, and was questioned. 
Following the questioning and some discussion and 
argumentation, the Judge found fir, Iverson m contempt, and 
imposed a sanction of a 30 day Jail sentence , commitment 
forthwith, fir. Iverson was denied any opportunity to perge 
himself before incarceration, but was taken immediately to 
the Salt Lake County Jail. After 11 days in Jail. fir. Iverson 
was able to file the Notice of Appeal and other papers to 
initiate this appeal and secure his release pending its 
ajudication. 
SIftTEPENI QL IHE. E££JS 
1* rir. Iverson 9s status is that of a simple individual, as in 
free from complications and combinations, a free and natural 
person. 
2. Mr. Iverson is not the recipient of any special grant from 
the state; he is not a priviledged person such as a firm, 
partnership, association, corporation, franchise, etc. 
3. fir* Iverson is not a taxpayer, but is a nontaxpayer, and 
does not engage m any revenue taxable activities. His 
activities are intentionally limited to the exercise of 
inalienable rights, (record p. 69 11. 15&1B) 
4. On August 14, 1985 , the State Tax Commission served fir. 
Iverson with a Notice of Deficiency for the years 1983-1984. 
(record p, SO 1. 15, p. 61 11. 20~25) 
5. Said Notice of Deficiency tuas based upon admittedly 
fabricated figures. No W-2 or other documents proving 
receipts of income during the years 1983 & 1984 have been 
presented to fir. Iverson or the court by the STC. (record p. 
61 11. 19-25) 
6. fir. Iverson challenged the accuracy of the allegations and 
figures both orally and through documents served and mailed 
to the 5TC. (record p. 61) 
7. Mr Iverson challenged the Jurisdiction of the STC to 
proceed thusly against him; demanding that they provide 
evidence of their jurisdiction and his being a taxpayer, 
(record p. 60 11. 14-18) 
8. The STC refused to hold a 'Formal' or 'Prior' hearing to 
take evidence and determine if fir. Iverson was a taxpayer. 
(Administrative record!) 
9. On flarch 21, 1986 four Commissioners of the Utah State Tax 
Commission signed and issued a SUBPOENA DUCES TECUfl 
commanding Mr. Iverson "... To appear before a hearing 
officer and/or commissioner(s) of the Utah State Tax 
Commissionon on the 10th day of April, 1986 at Room 510 Heber 
n. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah...", (record p. 59 11. EO-22) 
10. Said SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM was mailed to Mr. Iverson on 
April 10, 1986 by Certified nail No. 181679. (record p, 58 L 
19) 
11. fir. Iverson did not receive said subpoena until April 11, 
1986, one day after the day set certain for deposition. For 
this cause he did not appear as commanded on April 10, 1986. 
(record p. SB 11. 18-23) 
IE, On April S3, 1986 at 12:10 P.M. fir Iverson was served 
with a purported SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM in Garrison Utah, 
Millard County by a Special Agent of the STC. (record p. 11) 
13. Said second subpoena was an exact copy of the origional 
with the exception that the first page had been rewritten 
(altered) to read that Mr. Iverson was commanded to appear on 
May 5, 1988. The signature page on this second subpoena was 
an exact copy of the signature page of the first subpoena, 
(record p. 59 11. 17-22) 
1H. Said second subpoena claimed to be issued pursuant to UCA 
59~5~-li6(17) which grants the Commission power to: 
"•..subpoena 'witnesses' to appear and give testimony and to 
produce records, books, papers and documents relating to any 
matter which the commission has authority to investigate or 
determine..." (record p. 7) (Emphasis added) 
15. Said second subpoena claimed to be seeking information 
"... concerning your assets and/or assets which may or will 
become available to you and which will satisfy in whole or in 
part the Audit Deficiency entered against you...", (record p. 
7) 
IB. On April H9, 1S8B Mr. Iverson informed the STC, by mail, 
that he would not be present at the meeting on May 5, 1SBS, 
because of his belief that said second subpoena, which 
commanded him to appear on that date, was invalid, that it 
exceeded the scope of Jurisdiction of the STC, and that it 
was issued under color of law , among other reasons. Crecord 
p. 60 1. 3) 
17. On nay B, 1986, the STC filed a UERIFIED PETITION FOR 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE with the Tax Court of the Third Judicial 
District, and on that same day said Tax Court issued an ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE commanding fir. Iverson to appear on May IS, and 
"...then and there to show cause, if any he may have, why he 
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt and punished 
accordingly for failure to obey the Suboena Duces Tecum 
properly issued by the Utah State Tax Commission on the 21st 
day of March, 1986.". Crecord pp. E-6, 15-16) 
18. fir. Iverson was served with a copy of said UERIFIED 
PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, and a copy of the ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE by an STC Special Agent, on May IE in Garrison, 
Millard County, Utah. Crecord p. IS) 
19. This case came before the Tax Court as an origional 
action filed by the STC. Crecord p. 46 11. lS-El) 
20. This case did not come before the Tax Court as an appeal, 
and no appeal or petition for review of an STC decisions has 
be made to the Tax Court by an aggrieved taxpayer concerning 
these issues, (record p. 46 11. 3-5) 
21. On May 19, 1S8B fir. Iverson appeared specially before 
Judge Rigtrup in the Third District Tax Court to challenge 
the jurisdiction of said court to hear this case, and the 
jurisdiction of the STC to investigate this case, (record p. 
44 11. 11-15) 
22. Judge Rigtrup summarily overuled this objection to 
jurisdiction and refused to allow fir. Iverson to present 
evidence or argument in support of said challenge, (record p. 
52 11. 1-16) 
23. Judge Rigtrup also denied fir. iverson 'counsel of his 
choice', even though the hearing threatened, and in fact did 
result in, fir. Iverson*s imprisonment, (record pp. 47-48) 
24. By threatening contempt, Mr, Iverson was coerced to take 
the witness stand and be questioned by STC counsel, over his 
objection to being a witness against himself, (record p. 49 
11. 4~13) 
25. fir, Iverson was found in contempt by Judge Rigtrup and 
committed forthwith from the courtroom to the Salt Lake 
County Jail for thirty days, (record p. 73 11. 10-12) 
£6, fir. Iverson was not allowed an opportunity to purge 
himself of the contempt ruling before being whisked to Jail, 
despite his objections to such action. Crecord p. 74 11. 
14-2H) 
27. The NOTICE OF APPEAL initiating this Appeal was filed by 
fir. Iverson, while still in Jail, on flay 29, 19BB. Crecord p. 
24, pp. 29-30) 
SUntiARY QL GBSUnmiSL 
POINT 1 Appellant argues that he is not a 'taxpayer*, 
therefore, is not within the system of revenue laws and 
cannot be held liable for any performance they demand. 
POINT 11 Appellant argues that the administrative subpoena 
for which he was held in contempt; was issued by unauthorized 
persons, was directed to a person outside the statutory scope 
of UCA 59-5-46(17), and demanded that he appear for 
deposition outside his County contrary to URCP 45dC2). For 
these reasons it was invalid, having no force or power. 
POINT III Appellant argues that the Tax Court of the Third 
Judicial District is excluded by statute CUCA 59-24-1) from 
hearing instant case. 
u 
fiFSUtiENTS 
EQIWII JURISDICIlQIi QE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
IMffiXEB. bi NONTftXPftYER 
On numerous occasions during the proceedings of this 
case, both at the administrative level and at the Judicial 
hearing, I have challenged the Jurisdiction of the State Tax 
Commission Crecord p. 61 11. 10-13D; explaining that I am not 
a taxpayer and that the revenue laws are therefore not 
binding upon me. Both the STC and the Tax Court Judge have 
essentially ignored this claim as frivilous. No attempt has 
been made to prove that I am a taxpayer because they seem to 
have assumed that since I am alive and fairly well clothed 
and fed, I must of necessity be a taxpayer. This is of course 
an erroneous assumption, because it requires more than just 
being alive, fed and clothed to become a taxpayer. I suspect 
that the STC itself doesnst understand what it is that makes 
one a taxpayer. It therefore appears that in ordBr to 
maintain my defence, I must prove what makes a taxpayer and 
that I am not one; even though the burden of proof justly 
rests upon the STC, the accusers. 
Many of the citations and references used in the 
briefing of this point are of cases where the federal income 
tax laws were at issue. Such citations are still relevant to 
the case at hand since the Utah State Tax Commission has 
essentially adopted the Internal Revenue Code by statute in 
UCA 59-14A. 
For any competent attorney to properly understand this 
jurisdictional objection, he must become thoroughly familiar 
with the U.S. Supreme Court rulings concerning income 
taxation and revenue laws, As recently as 1972, they ruled: 
"The revenue laws are a code or system in 
regulation of tax assessment and collection. Theu 
H P W P iSL taxpayers s M oat to nontaxpauers, the 
latter are without their scope. No, procedure is 
prescribed for nontaxpauers. and no attempt is 
made to annul any of their rights and remedies in 
due course of law." 
Long v. Rasmuseen. 281 F. 236, at 238. (1922); 
^pqnpmy EJLymfaJLIlBL and Heating v^ . U.S. .470 F. 2d 
585, at 589. (1972) (Emphasis added) 
Obviously this issue resolves itself down to a matter of 
definition, which the U.5» Supreme Court also recognized and 
declared in the Sheafer v^ Carter case in 1920 CSheafer v^ 
Carter 252 U.S. 37, at p. 553 Who then is a Taxpayer and who 
is a nontaxpayer is the ail important definition to be 
resolved here. UCA 59~-14A-4(c) defines a taxpayer as: 
(c) The term "taxpayer" means any individual, 
estate, or trust or beneficiary thereof, whose 
income jjj, subject in whole or part to the tax 
imposed by this act. UCft 59~14ft~4(c) (Emphasis 
added) 
this pivotal term is further defined in the Internal Revenue 
Code at sections 1313(b). 
Cb) Notwithstanding section 7701(a)(14), the 
term "taxpayer" means any person subject to a tax 
under the applicable revenue laws. 
2& U.5.C. 1313(b) (Emphasis added) 
From these references it is clear that the term "taxpayer" 
applies only to those persons who are sub lect to a tax under 
the applicable revenue law. 
In order to determine who is subject to the "income 
tax", the nature of that tax must be analyzed. Let us begin 
with the U.S. Constitution which speaks of two general 
classes of taxes that may be imposed: direct and indirect. 
Uery specific and precise instuctions on the application of 
each is also given. The U.S. Supreme Court comments thusly on 
these two classes: 
"In the matter of taxation, the Constitution 
recognizes the two great classes of direct and 
indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which 
their imposition must be governed, namely: the 
rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the 
rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts and 
excises." 
R P U P G K v^ Farmens' Loan & Trust Co. , 157 U.S. 
429, at 557 (1B95); 
BfMgWgr iL^  Union Pacific R.R. Co.f 240 U.S. 1, 
at 13. (1916) (Emphasis added) 
It is said that the income tax is pursuant to the 
Sixteenth Amendment of our U.S. Constitution, which states: 
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several states, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration." 
Sixteenth Amendment. (19133 .• . . 
Since the only class of tax that can be .laid en incomes 
without apportionment among the several states, and without 
regard to any census ur enumeration, is an iiiillrjiet. tax; ue 
can see that the 'without apportionment' language of this 
amendment confines the "'income tax" to the class of indirect: 
taxes only* For example, in v.he cas^s uf ElliialliifeSL v,„;„ UHlSll 
Facifi c gjJL., 240 U.S. lt and Stanton y_L, Baltic, Mining Co^, 
240 U.S. 103, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixteenth 
Amendment, and the Income tax act passed un"!';r it, are 
constitutional because they only concern indirect tax esf end 
because the Amendment iotas not authorize tho Ll,,.:r,,,.ci.c.t L^J^Cikll 
of incomes or even confer any new power of taxation, nor decs 
i t i 11 any <uaij a 11er , change , «?n 1 arge or af i ect the tax ing 
power origionally conferred upon Congress by Article 1, 
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 
,J
'(T)he contention that the amendment treats a tax 
on income as a direct tax ... is ..* wholly 
without foundation n 
gru?h§ber ^u. union Pacifi c, R^JR^ iiy.„, mo u.s. I, 
at page 18, C19161 (Emphasis added J 
"CT)he Sixteenth Amendment conferred NO NEW POWER 
OF TAXATION but simply prohibited the previous 
complete and plenary power of income taxation 
posessed by Congress from the beginning from heinj 
taken out of the category of indirect taxation to 
which it inherantly belonged..,." 
Stantan v^„ Baltic runing Co.. 240 u.s. 103, at 
page 115. C1316 3 (Emphasis added) 
"CT)he conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did 
not in any degree involve holding that income 
taxes generically and necessarily came within the 
class of direct taxes on property, but on the 
contraru recognized the FACT that taxation on 
income was in its nature an excise entitled to be 
enforced as such.,.." 
BfUghaber, supra, at pages 16-17. (Emphasis added) 
Because the income tax is by its nature an excise tax, 
it cannot actually be assessed on income as property, but 
rather is assessed on revenue taxable events, incidents or 
activities, from which the income is merely used for 
measuring the tax. Hence, the name "income tax". It is 
aSgaEtilDtt to the income and not upon the income itself. The 
class of taxes which are indirect includB imposts, duties, 
and excises, and such taxes are never upon any kind of 
property, but only upon revenue taxable activities, which 
include, but are not limited to , the exercise of certain 
procured priviledges, such as doing business in a corporate 
capacity, where the measure of activity is typically income, 
sales, inventory.etc. 
In 191S, when th U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Sixteenth Amendment and the nature 
of an income tax, the court relied on an earlier ruling made 
in 1911 in the case of Flint v^ Stone Tracu Qs^,220 U.S. 107. 
The court held in said case, that a tax measured by the 
income of corporations or insurance companies is not a tax 
directly on income as property, but an indirect, or excise, 
tax upon the business activity of corporations which are 
lawfuJ subjects nf* trrntion, 
"Within the category ot indirect taxalun, as we 
shall have further occasion to show, is embraced a 
tax upon business done ir * corporate capacity..." 
runt £* atons. icacii CQ^, rvo u.s. t07, at iso 
C1911) 
»ye must remember, too, that the revenues ol the 
United States must be obtained in the same 
territory, from the same people, and excise taxes 
must be collected from the same activities as are 
also reached by the states in order to support 
their local governments*" 
Flint, SUiiLi, at 154 . * Emphasis added > 
"Conceding th© power of Congress to id,, the 
business activities of private corporations ,. 
the tax must be measured by some standard... " 
"It is therefore well settled by l he decisions nf 
this court that mhBn the soverign authority has 
exercised the right to tax a legitimate subjert of 
taxation as an exercise of a franchise or 
pnviledge, it is no objection that the measure* ut 
taxation is found in the income...." 
Flint, suora. at 1B5. CEmphasis added) 
From this ruling UB r-*n see that the activities of a 
corporation fire indeed legitimate subjects of taxation, but 
u»hat activities; aro pat; Ipgitimate suhjocts ot taxation'"'1 
Again the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled: 
WA state may not impose a charge for thn enjoyment 
of a right guaranteed Ly the i oderaJ 
Constitution." 
HurqgffK SLS. Pgnnuslyyua, 3ia u.s. IOU, at H D . 
C1943) 
Th3 f e d e r a l gov u"iiT^Jiit a? r* I na s t a i n UUVCL "irrnnts 
c a n n o t , aTlJL t h e r e f o r e £n y\ t n± t a x e d t h e t r e e L ^ B F J I S B uf 
c o n s t i t u t ituiH 1 ly s e c u r e d r i r j h t s . Nn example of a ' LaApayec * 
t h e n i s one u^ho i s engaged i n a r e v e n u e t a x a b l e a c t i v i t y , 
while an example of a 'nantaxpayer' is one whose activities 
are merely the exercise of inalienable, Constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. One who lawfully contracts his own labor 
to engage in innocent and harmless activities in exchange for 
lawful compensation cannot be taxed for revenue purposes , 
and is therefore not a 'taxpayer' as defined by statute, but 
is a 'nontaxpayer' and is entitled to all the fruits of his 
labors. 
"The right to labor and to its protection from 
unlawful interference is a constitutional as well 
as a common-law right. Every man has a natural 
right to the fruits of his own industry." 
ifi BSSL Jur 2d. Section 2, Page BO. 
An indirect tax , as the 'income tax' has been ruled to 
be, is never a tax upon the tangible fruit, but rather upon 
the taxable event or activity. 
"A tax laid upon the happening of an event, as 
distinguished from its tangible fruits, is an 
Indirect £&&. •.." 
Tuler v. U.S.. 281 U.S. 437, at 502 C1S30) 
(Emphasis added) 
Knowing that the so-called 'income tax' is in fact an 
indirect tax and in its nature an excise tax, it follows that 
said excise tax cannot be, and therefore has not been, 
imposed upon an individual in his exercise of a natural right 
secured by the U.S. Constitution, one of said rights being 
the right of existance. The Oregon Supreme Court has so 
stated: 
"The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot; be 
taxed for the mere priviledge of existing, This 
corporation is an artificial entity which owes its 
existence and charter powers to the state; but the 
individuals' rights to live and own property are 
natural rights, for the enjoyment of which an 
BXfiASB BflPnqt fa& ifflBflaSd.." 
Kffflftqld ^ UshSJL, 232 P. 8 1 3 . a t 6 1 3 , C1930) 
CEmphasis added) 
Here we come to the heart of this argument; to prove 
that I am a taxpayer, the STC must show that I have been 
engaged in a revenue taxable activity,, event, or enterprise, 
as compared to merely exercisino Constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. The mere Fact that '! '. . . I ' m alive, because I haven't 
died Fram ! \unger, havei t' t starved to death, becai ise I have 
clothes and conclude from that that I must be a taxpayer...." 
(record p. SB ) is not proof of being a taxpayee subject to 
UCA Title 59-14A the Individual Income Tax Act, If they have 
nat, and c annot p r eve t ha t I am a t a x p a y er a11 t h eir a 11 e mpt s 
to a pp.] y " the code or system in regulation of tax 
collection. " are null and without effect because sai d code or 
system "... relate to taxpayers and not to nontaxpayers, The 
latter are without their scope,,.*" '.quotations from Economy 
ElumfalDfl. S M Heating v^ U. S, , 470 f .Ed 585, at 589 3, 
Furthermore, any a11empts to coerce me i nto f o11 oining 
procedures prescribed for taxpayers, such as the Filing of 
Petitions for Redetermination, is of no use because I, being 
a nontaxpayer, can receive no benefit from such procedure: 
"Persons who are not taxpayers are not within the 
system and can obtain no benefit by following the 
procedure prescribed for taxpayers...." 
Economy
 >gjJB£gL, at page 590. 
Absent proof that I am a taxpayer subject to the revenue 
laws, the STC has no standing to issue Notices of Deficiency 
or obtain warrents against me or mine. They have no authority 
to investigate or determine any matter concerning me or mine; 
therefore any subpoena issued pursuant to UCA 59-5-46C17} in 
this case is misapplied and in error, having no power. The 
Judgement of contempt for not obeying such a subpoena and the 
imposition of a Jail sentence as sanctions is clearly 
unlawful and ought to be reversed and dismissed respectively. 
PPINI II IHE. PPniNISIBftTWE SUBFQENA ai ISSUE UAS INUALID 
If the circumstances of this case were different and I 
had indeed been involved in a revenue taxable activity, 
thereby being a taxpayer; the contempt ruling would still be 
in error because the administrative subpoena involved was 
improperly issued. It is my contention that said 
administrative subpoena commanding me to "... appear'before a 
hearing officer and/or commissionerCs) of the Utah State Tax 
Commissio n on the 5th day o f n a y , 19 8 6 a t r o a in 5 1 0 , H e h e i: • fl. 
Ueils building, 1H0 Last 300 South, Salt I ake City, Utah 
84134 at 10:00 a.m., then ai id there to give testimony and be 
deposed.,," '.record p. />, was and is an invalid subpoena 
because of the folioumny reasons*. 
First, that said, subpoena uaa not in fact issued by the 
State Tax Commission., but was concocked by a 'compliance 
o f f i c e r' a nd i s the re fore a fra t j d. In su pp o rt of 11 \ is 
contention ! point out that on April 11, 1986 ! received a 
certified letter #161579, from, the STC containing a SUBPOENA 
DLICES TECUH comma.nding me ta appear o? I the 101i I of April, 
1986'. Page 4 of th i s doci jment was dated f 1 arch 21, 198B, and 
s i gned by the Utah State Iax Commission: M ark K* Buch i? Joe 
B * P ache c o, R ,  H . H a n s e n , a r 1 d R o g e r 0 . I e w . N a t u r a 11 y I c o u 1 d 
not appear as commanded because the time and date set certain 
had already passed before I was notified trecord p. 58 
11 , 18-23). 
1 became suspicious when on April 23, 1386, I was served 
with another document, purporting to be a subpoena from the 
Stata Tax Commission, cormia^dJ ng rnw tn appear o? \ a di ffei ent 
date, but the signature pnge was identical to that of tl iti 
first document (record p, SS 11. 1-4) . It mas quite appai ant 
that the second document was a forgery since the 
commissioners would not reasonably sign tup subpoenas on the 
same day, to the same person, for the same reason, but 
commanding him to appear on different dates almost a month 
apart, and then have them delivered on such divergent days. 
During the hearing on May 19, 1986, I challenged the validity 
of the second document purported to be a subpoen which 
commanded appearance on flay 5, 1386, because of this very 
point. The STC presented no evidence, nor even any argument 
supporting the validity of that purported subpoena. Mr. 
Miller, counsel for the STC, admitted that there were two 
documents involved, but did not want to talk about the first 
document (record p. 59 11. 10-163. Obviously it is improper 
to find a person in contempt and imprison him for not obeying 
a forged, and therefore invalid subpoena! 
The second point supporting the invalid subpoena 
argument is that while the power to subpoena is available to 
the commissioners of the STC under UCA 59-5-46(17), I as a 
putative defendant in such a proceeding am not a 'witness* 
within the meaning of that subsection, therefore the STC is 
without power to subpoena me pursuant to it. This contention 
is fully supported by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. (linker. 350 U.S. 173 (Addendum #1), which is 
a case where a naturalized citizen was administratively 
subpoened as a 'witness* in an investigation maintained for 
the purpose of determining whether denaturalization 
proceedings should be instituted against him. The court held 
that he was a putative defendant in such proceedings and was 
not a 'witness* within the statute conferring subpoena power 
upon immigration officers. 
The para] iels between the fiinker case and the one at 
hand are striking with only slight differences which are 
ultimately immaterial to the issues* Both concern a citizen 
ui h o i s u n d e r t h e p r o t a c t i v e g t J a r a n t e e s c F t h e o r g a n i c 1 a a J s o f 
the United states* Both concern a situation where that 
citizen is under investigation by an administrative agency of 
govs r n m e n t . B o t h a rt m i n i s t r a 11 v e a g e n c i e s c 1 a i rn s u b p o e n a 
powers pursuant to a specific sf: acute. Both statutes relied 
upon, grant the agency power to subpoena 'witnesses , uaing 
that very term UJCft 53-55-46(17), addendum ttl p.883), The U.S. 
Supreme Court concludes its cpinion in said fiinker case by 
stating: 
"A11 11 iac3 consideraticnB converge to the 
conclusion chat Congress has not provided with 
sufficient clarity that the subppena power granted 
by (sec. )E?3SCa) extends over persons who are the 
subject of denaturalization investigations; 
therefor& Congress is not to be deemed to have 
done so impliedly." 
UDliLSJSi StSLfcSS. X. Ilinker 350 U.S. 173 at ISO 
CAddendum #1) 
Mr. Justice Frankferter delivered the opinion of the 
Court, hut Mr* Justice Black felt so strongly on some of 
these issues that he delivered his own concurring opinion, in 
which he expressed the issues and concerns so appropriately 
that I must pass on his exact words; 
"The respondent Minker is a naturalized citizen 
of the United States. He was subpoened by an 
immigration officer to appear and give testimony 
as a 'witness.* But Ninker was not to be a witness 
within the traditional meaning of that word, that 
is, one who testifies in a court proceeding or in 
a public quasi-Judicial hearing of some kind,.. 
The object in summoning Minker was to interrogate 
him in the immigration officer's private chambers 
to try to elicit information "relating to the 
possible institution of proceedings seeking the 
revocation of mmm CMinker'sI] naturalization. ***" 
Information so obtained might be used under some 
circumstances in court to take away (linker's 
American citizenship or convict him of perjury or 
some other crime. Thus the capacity m which this 
immigration officer was acting was precisely the 
same as that of a policeman, constable, sheriff, 
or Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who 
interrogates a person, perhaps himself a suspect, 
in connection with murder or some other crime... 
And we have frequently set aside state criminal 
convictions as a denial of due process of law 
because of coersive questioning of suspects by 
public prosecutors and other law enforcement 
officers in their official chambers... Yat power 
of the Attorney General and immigration officers 
to compel persons, including suspects, to appear 
and subject themselves to questioning by law 
enforcement officers in their private chambers is 
precisely what the Department of Justice claims 
here... The person summoned must go to an 
immigration officer's private chambers for 
questioning by him, out of which may come a 
prosecution against the "witness" for perjury or 
some other crime. A purpose to subject aliens, 
much less citizens, to a police practice so 
dangerous to individual liberty as this should not 
be read into an Act of Congress in the absence of 
a clear and unequivocal congressional mandate,.. 
rUnfrffr Suora at 190-196 (Addendum #13 
"...It would have been surprising had 
Congress attemped to authorize the Nation's chief 
prosecuting officer and his subordinates to compel 
a citizen to appear in government private offices 
to answer questions about that citizen's conduct, 
associations and beliefs. Some countries give such 
powers to their officials. It is to be hoped that 
this country never will." 
ninker Supra at 195-196 (addendum #1) 
It is equally as deplorable mhen states governme? tal 
ofticiaio assume sucn subpoena powers which result, as in 
this cafie, in the unlawful iniprii.onrr.eTit of a citizen because 
he demands end stanls ( irmly tor hts i nal if:,id!i l.e right 
against self incrimination! ^s is now clear, the proper 
interpretation of 53' -5-4BC17) UCA granting the SIC pawar to 
subpoena 'witnesses' doss i lot extend to perso? iss sue! \ as 
myself, who are putative defendants in such proceedings, 
Therefore the subpoena in question, which was thusly issued, 
i s nu1i a nd vo id, a n d a ny co nt e mpt r u1i ng s and sanctions 
imposed are, and were unlawful* 
The th,t rd point, supporting the nival id subpoena argi tment 
is that the document purported to be a suhno^n far exceeds 
the scope of authority of a proper supuena both in subject 
mafctei and geoyrap) ucally. Said subpoena states that 1 am 
", , , to give testimony ei id be deposed concerning your assets 
and/or assets which may or will become availahl e to yo* i which 
will satisfy in whole or in part the Audit Deficiency entered 
against you, ., "(record p. 73; and yet of the ten questions 
asked, numbers 3,6,7
 ( B, :3 0, and part of number 3 1 amd 4 ai: e 
seeking evidence of income for the years 1983 and 1SB4 rather 
than assets which can satisfy the purported, Audit Deficiency. 
T h e S T C it! o u I d 1 i k e t: o t u r n t h i s i n t o a w i d e o p e n 
investigation , a fishing expedition i* gou ^.^ , ti, ru: n up 
.something upon which they can prosecute' mt*. 
Furhtermore, said subpoena was served on me in Garrison, 
Millard County, Utah, commanding me to appear at the offices 
of the STC in SAlt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Such a 
subpoena for deposition is in obvious violation of Rule 
45dC2) URCP which provides: 
(2) A resident of the state may be required to 
attend an examination onlu in the county wherein 
he resides or is employed or transacts his 
business in person-.." 
URCP 45d(53 (Emphasis added) 
I do not reside, nor an I employed, nor do I transact 
business in person in Salt Lake County; therefore I cannot be 
required to attend a subpoena in that county. When confronted 
with this argument during the hearing on May 19, 1986, fir. 
Miller argued that "...it's irrelevant because the Tax 
Commission is not operating pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure." (record p. 67 11. 1B-SQ3. Is Mr. Miller saying 
that the STC has more sweeping and unrestricted authority 
than the courts? Does the Tax Commission, an administrative 
agency, have more subpoena power than the judicial courts of 
the State of Utah? It appears at least that the Tax 
Commission thinks it has, but such administrative procedure 
is just not consistent with the safeguards which the 
legislature has provided in the judicial process. For them to 
infer that they have wider and more encompassing subpoena 
power than a Judicial court is ridiculous, but not surprising 
since the United States Supreme Court has warned us that the 
subpoena power: 
"...is a power capable of oppressive use, 
especially when it may be indiscriminately 
delegated and the subpoena is not returnable 
before a Judicial officer." 
UnltSd StStBS )L (linker 350 U.S. 17U at 1Q7. 
The subpoena \n question i& a prime example of just such 
'oppressive uvs' and is invalid bur; in^e it; far axceodf" lliu 
scope of a subpoena, properly issued consistent with 
1egis1ativa safeguards. 
POINT ill JURISDICTION QL IHE. I M COURT 
At the very heyirniny nf the hi?n,"inr; on this coso, I 
informed the court ibut 1 was appearing r3p^u;aily to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the lax Court uf the Third 
Judicial District (record p.44 11. ll-l~n. By U.S. Supremo 
Court deciciration "once jui'lsciicticn is challenged, it nu'it 
be proven. "Cttaflfina y^J^^jji^, 4 15 LOS! b33, note 33 for 
mere "pood Faith" assertions of power and authority have besn 
abolished CQui^ ns v. Indiana. 445 U.S. 6623 CEmphasiss added). 
In response to this jurisdictional challenge, counsel 
for t! ?e SIC argued that 1 JCA /£•'-..*\.J •• i1.: "'...gives the court 
power to entertain such a matter an an order to show cause, 
and that is the basis of the jurisdiction." (record p, 45 K , 
15-17 3. It is true that said statute gives fei court' such 
powers, but it specifically states that the court so 
empowered is the district court, and makes no mention of the 
Tax Court. It is my contention that while the district courts 
are indeed courts of general jurisdiction created by the Utah 
Constitution, and directed by title 78 UCft, the Judicial 
Code; the Tax Court is not mentioned in the constitution but 
is a legislative creation, authorized by UCA 53-24-1 which 
states: 
There is created a tax division in each of the distrit 
courts of the State of Utah which shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions for 
review of decisions by the state tax commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the commission. UCQ 
59-54-1 
I have read and analyzed this statute extensively and 
contend that the intent of the legislature is best understood 
through the very words of the act. I have confidence that 
our legislators are very proficient in the construction and 
use of the English language, and that when they use the word 
"exclusive", they intend it to convey the meaning as commonly 
accepted* Such common acceptance is properly verified by 
consulting a well established dictionary such as Uebster's 
New Twentieth Century Dictionary which defines "exclusive": 
1. Excluding all others; shutting out other 
considerations, happenings, existences, occupations, 
etc.; as, vefiglsjaia and mineral are exclusive terms. 
2. Having the tendency or power to exclude all others 
3. Excluding all but what is specified; as, onlu is an 
S^ cJUiaiva particle. 
4. Not shared or divided; sole; single; as, an exclusive 
right to sell, something. 
By this commonly accepted definition, the Tax Court is only 
granted jurisdiction in a very precise and specific 
circumstance, which is determined ny the occurrence of three 
distinctly identifiable events, which are:? precisely outlined 
in the statute, namely; 
1. There must have been a decision rendered by the State 
Tax Commission. 
B. That decision must, have beer •^ '-^ sn;-?! §?£!•.££. fooi:X 
hearings before the Commission* 
3. fin appeal from or a petition for review of that 
decisions so rendered, must be brought to the Tax Court. 
If any of these indicia are missing then the issue does not 
fa 11 uiithiTI t: he 'ilfexc 1 usiv£3" J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Tax Cour t and 
must he taken elswhere. 
Since UOA 59-24-1 is the only jurisdictional grant to a 
"Tax Court'* in all of the Utah Cods or the Utah State 
Constitution, it must he the sole source of jurisdiction and 
is evidence that the Tax Court is exclusively an appellate 
court of the adm ini str a11 vF pror:odtJre of f; 1"'.e St af e Tax 
Commission , created for the benefit and use of the aqqr i r.vad 
taxpauerT who wishes to appeal a decision cf the STC . It was 
never i nter,ded tc become t!ie pr J. v atc ei"«f :;> rcement arm of the 
STC in which they bring all their grievances as origional 
actions. This contention is supported by a ri 111? tg of this 
Supreme Court in a recent case concerning proper ty taxation. 
Said ruling in part reads: 
"The statutory scheme establishing the tax 
divisions...provides onlu that the tax division may 
review decisions, determinations, and orders of the Tax 
Commission, section 59-24-3 CSupp. 1983), and may 
"affirm, reverse, modify or remand any order of the 
state tax commission, and shall grant other relief, 
invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in 
accordance with its decision, as shall be appropriate." 
Section 59-24-4 CSupp. 1983). 
Kennecott v Salt Lake Countu. 23 UAR, p. 47 (Emphasis 
added) 
The STC argues that the general jurisdictional powers of 
the district court spread over into the Tax Court. This 
confusion may be because the Tax Court and its proceedings 
are held in the district court facilities and are presided 
over by a district court Judge. I contend that when a 
district court Judge sits in the legislatively created Tax 
Court, he is limited by the "Tax Court Act" C59-24 UCA) to 
the position of an appellate court Judge, not the Judge of a 
court of origional Jurisdiction like the district court. The 
Tax Court of any Judicial district is not the district court 
of that Judicial district, nor is the district court the Tax 
Court, but they are two distinct and seperate courts, each 
with its own powers, grants, and scope of Jurisdiction. UCA 
59-24-1 has no effect on the Jurisdiction or powers of the 
district court, neither restricting them nor expanding them. 
This statute simply created an intermediate forum between the 
State Tax Commission and the Utah Supreme Court for hearing 
appeals from and petitions for review of State Tax Commission 
decisions rendered after formal hearings. The district 
court's involvement is strictly for sta^finp and facilities, 
and not for derivation of jurisdiction, If the I.rgi slature 
heel intended, otherwise thay would not have created a 
str.tutoiy Tax Court limited by such exclusive, jurisri ict i on 
but would have simply used the existing district courts as 
they were. The statute is very clear on this point and should 
be strictly followed. 
Perhaps a couplo of pertinent questions and their 
answers will aid in seeing this distinction, First, if the 
Tax Court of the Third Judicial District; is simply a district 
court judge to whom all tax reioteci issues are assigned, why 
did it Lake a legislative act to create it? M simple 
categorizing of cases could have been accomplished by the 
district count itself through its own case assignment 
process. Tha answer to this question is clearly that: the 
Legislature had more in mind than simply categorizing of 
cases. 
Secondly, before the p*rv.-.?.'.rjp raf The Tax Court Act (59-24 
UCA) in 1977, what court had appelate jurisdiction over 
"...appeals from and petitions for review of decisions by the 
state tax commission... ,,? Was it the District Courts? No *t 
was nutf Before the passage of said Tax Lourt Act this, the 
Supreme Court of the state, had such Jurisdiction. Ibis is 
indicated by the fact that the State lax Commission Code of 
Administrative Procedure in sections 1-1C13) and 8-1 still 
refer to this, the Supreme Court, as the proper court of 
appeal from Commission decisions. Obviously the legislature 
created the Tax Courts of the various judicial districts for 
the purpose of relieving this the Utah Supreme Court of some 
of its case burden by creating an interum forum for resolving 
some of the issues. The District Courts have never had 
appelate Jurisdiction of appeals from State Tax Commission 
decisions, nor do they now have such jurisdiction. Likewise, 
the Tax Court has never had, nor does it now have general, 
origional jurisdiction over all tax issues, but has 
M
...exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions 
for review of decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the commission.". Here is the 
point of my argument: since the Tax Court is "exclusively" an 
appelate court, it is barred, by the statute creating it, 
from hearing instant case which comes as an origional action 
commensed by the State Tax Commission, not an appeal from any 
of their decisions!(record p. 46 11. 13-20) 
This case therefore does not fall within the exclusive 
Jurisdiction of the Tax Court and cannot be determined by it; 
therefore, the contempt ruling and sanctions imposed are and 




Reason, logic and common sence tells one that 'status' 
is the first point to be considered when applying a code or 
system of laws to a person. It mould be ridiculous to argue 
that a civilian is subject to the military code; equally sos 
it is ridiculous to assume that a nontaxpayer is subject to 
UCA 59-14A, the Individual Income Tax Act. Absent proof that 
a person is involved in a revenue taxable activity or event 
which makes him a taxpayer, he cannot be assumed to be such 
by the mere fact of his existence. Furthermore, a person 
existing by exercising inalienable, constitutionally 
guaranteed rights, is not a taxpayr because a state cannot 
impose a charge or excise upon the enjoyment of a right. 
Therefore, if the STC cannot produce evidence, beyond my 
existence, that I am indeed a taxpayer subject to the revenue 
code, they have no Jurisdiction to investigate me, to file 
returns on my behalf, to claim deficiencies, to assess fines 
and penalties,to file warrants with the county, to subpoena 
'witnesses* concerning me, nor to otherwise harass and 
intimidate me. Lacking such Jurisdiction, any and all of the 
above activities are null and void, being done under color of 
law only. 
Even if I were a taxpayer, the document purporting to be 
a subpoena, and for which I was ruled in contempt, was 
improperly issued and therefore of no force and effect. Three 
errors on the part of the STC make the purported document 
invalid as a subpoena, namely: 
First, because it was not 'issued1 by the Commissioners 
of the STC, but was concocted by a compliance agent with a 
signature page taken from another document. UCA 59-5-46C17) 
specifically gives subpoena power to the Commission, but does 
not give it to anyone else, nor does it authorize the 
Commission to delegate said power. Therefore a subpoena, such 
as the one at issue here, which is not personally signed and 
issued by the Commission (meaning the five Commissioners) is 
invalid and therefore carries no authority. 
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Hinker 350 U.S. 173, has ruled that the term 'witness', as 
used in statutes confering subpoena power to administrative 
governmental agencies, does not include a putative defendent 
such as I. The Justices voiced their concerns thusly: 
"...compulsory exparte administrative examination, 
untrammelled by the safeguards of a public 
adversary Judicial proceeding, afford too ready 
opportunity for unhappy consequences to 
prospective defendants..." 
Flinker. Supra at p. 188 (Addendum #1) 
If I, as a prospective defendant cannot be included 
within the scope of the meaning of the word 'witness' as used 
in UCft 59~S-~46C17), then the STC has no authority to command 
my appearance. Any purported subpoena served upon me pursuant 
to such is nothing more than a piece of paper with an 
expensive delivery price. 
Thirdly,because the purported administrative subpoena 
attempts to compel mo beyond the limits established for 
properly issued Judicial subpoenas. URCP 45dCE) states that 
except by court order specifying otherwise, a resident may be 
required to attend an examination onlu in the countu wherein 
jtlfi. resides or is employed or transacts business in person. 
The purported supoena demanded that I appear in the private 
offices of the STC in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County. Since 
I neither reside, transect business in person, nor am 
employed in Salt lake County, even a Judicial subpoena cannot 
normally compel my appearance there, much less an 
administrative subpoena! 
Should the facts and circumstances of this case be so 
different that I were a taxpayer, and that the purported 
subpoena were valid, the contempt ruling and the sanction 
imposed would still be in error because the Tax Court of the 
Third Judicial District lacks Jurisdiction to even consider 
this case. The sole grant of authority to the Tax Courts is 
found in UCft 59-24-1 which gave them Jurisdiction over 
appeals from and petitions for review of decisions rendered 
by the STC after formal hearings. Prior to the passage of 
this act all such appeals and petitions for review were 
brought directly to this Supreme Court. It is clear to all 
who care to see that the Tax Court was created specifically 
and exclusively as an interim appellate court to relieve this 
court of some of its case load. If a case would not qualify 
to be heard by this court before the passage of the Tax Court 
Act, then it cannot be heard by the Tax Court now. The STC 
would never consider bringing an origional action for 
enforcement of an administrative subpoena to this Utah 
Supreme Court; and yet they are attempting to use the 
appellate Tax Court as their private enforcement arm, 
bringing all their grievances as origional actions there. Let 
me emphasize again that the Tax Court is an appealate court 
for the use of the aarieved taxpayer. In the instant case 
there is no agrieved taxpayer,and no appeal has been filed 
(record p. 46 11. 15-25). Therefore the Tax Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear this case and any ruling it makes, or 
sanctions it imposes are done under color of law only and are 
not valid. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is my contention that the 
contempt of court ruling , and the sanction of thirty days 
imprisonment imposed by the Tax Court Judge are in error, fly 
prayer to this court is that the Judgement be reversed, the 
remaining sanctions canceled, costs and fees be awarded me 
for having to defend myself, and punatitive damages awarded . 
«Jit ' * 
DATED this ^ day of At*§t»t, 19B6. 
/ /. I, 
Clay K. Iverson 







 AODLNdUM * I 
elsewhere: "A st*a i> 
presumably manifesting" * 
policy, properly makes demands on the 
judicial process." National City Bank 
of New York v. Republic of China, 348 
U S. 356, SGO, 75 S Ct. 423, 427. 
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tnand the case to the 
for that purpose. 
Surely in the light of all that has hap-
pened since 1910 in the general field of 
the law of arbitration, it is not for us to 
assume that the Court of Appeals, if it 
had that question for consideration, 
could not have found that the law of Ver-
mont today does not require disregard 
of a provision 
212 
of a contract made in New 
York, with a purposeful desire to have 
the law of New York govern, to ac-
complish a result that today may be 
deemed to be a general doctrine of the 
law. Of course, if the Court of Appeals, 
versed in the general juiisprudence of 
Vermont and having among its members 
a Vermont lawyer, should find that the 
Vermont court would, despite the New 
York incidents of the contract, apply 
Vermont law and that it is the habit of 
the Vermont court to adhere to its prece-
dents and to leave changes to the legisla-
ture, it would not be for the federal court 
to gainsay that policy. I am not suggest-
ing what the Court of Appeals' answer to 
these questions would be, still less what 
it should be. I do maintain that the de-
fendant does have the right to have the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on 
that question and that it is not for us to 
deny him tliat right. 
I would remand the case to the Court 
of Appeals for its determination of Ver-
mont law on matters which the basis of 
its decision heretofore rendered it need-
less to consider. 
Mr. Justice HARLAN, concurring. 
I concur in the opinion of the Court ex-
cept insofar as it undertakes to review 
and affirm the District Court's interpre-
tation of Vermont law. I agree with Mr. 
Justice FRANKFURTER that the re-
view of questions of state law should 
ordinarily be left to the Courts of Ap-
76 S.Ct —18Vi 
Mr. Justice BURTON, dissenting. 
Whether or not § 3 of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act is applicable to this con-
tract, the judgment of the Couit of Ap-
peals should be afthmed. 
Assuming the validity of the arbitra-
tion clause in the New York contract 
here invohed, I regard the procedure 
213 
which it prescribes as a permissible 
"form of trial." See Murray Oil Prod-
ucts Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 
381. Accordingly, the United States 
District Court for the District of Ver-
mont may stay its own proceedings to 
await completion of| the arbitration pro-
ceedings, although a state court of Ver-
mont would not do likewise. I do not in-
terpret Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 58 S.Ct 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, or Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 
U.S. 99, 65 S Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, as 
requiring the contrary. 
350 U.S. 179 
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Two cases, in one of which the Court 
of Appeals, Third Circuit, 217 F.2d 350, 
held that a naturalized citizen subpoe-
naed as a "witness" in an investigation 
maintained for purpose of determining 
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whether denaturalization proceedings 
should be instituted against him was a 
putative defendant in such proceeding 
and was not a "witness" within the stat-
ute conferring subpoena power upon im-
migration officers. In the other case the 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 219 F. 
2d 137, in reversing a District Court de-
cision, 116 F.Supp. 464, rendered a con-
flicting decision. The cases came to the 
Supreme Court on certiorari. The Su-
preme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
held that the naturalized citizens under 
such circumstances were not "witnesses" 
within the meaning of the statute. 
Judgment of Third Circuit affirmed; 
judgment of Second Circuit reversed. 
1. Courts e=>383(l) 
Where Second and Third Circuits 
divided on question whether statute em-
powers immigration officer to subpoena 
a naturalized citizen to determine if good 
cause exists for institution of denaturali-
zation proceedings, Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. Immigration and 
Nationality Act, §§ 235(a), 340(a), 8 U. 
S.C.A. §§ 1225(a), 1451(a). 
2. Aliens e=>71(l) 
Section of Immigration and Nation-
ality Act conferring subpoena power on 
any commissioner of immigration or in-
spector in charge strictly defines pur-
poses for which officers can subpoena 
witnesses and does not confer power to 
issue subpoenas as aids in investigating 
potential naturalization offenses. Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, § 235(a), 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1225(a). 
3. Aliens e=>71(l) 
Word "Act" as used in section of 
Immigration and Nationality Act relat-
ing to subpoenas, in clause "or concern-
ing any matter which is material and 
relevant to the enforcement of this Act 
and the administration of the Service," 
refers not to title or section but to entire 
statute. Immigration and Nationality 
Act, §§ 215(g), 235(a), 241(a) (2), 290 
(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1185(g), 1225(a), 
1251(a) (2), 1360(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Act". 
4. Statutes €=5211 
The title of a statute and the head-
ing of a section cannot limit the plain 
meaning. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
C=>303 
Where administrative action may re-
sult in loss of both property and life, or 
of all that makes life worth living, any 
doubt as to extent of power delegated to 
administrative officials is to be resolved 
in citizen's favor, and court must be es-
pecially sensitive to citizen's rights 
where proceeding is non-judicial. Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, §§ 101 et 
seq., 235(a), 284, 340(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1101 et seq„ 1225(a), 1354, 1451(a). 
6. Aliens C=>71(1) 
Naturalized citizens who were each 
the subject of denaturalization investi-
gation were not "witnesses" within stat-
ute conferring power on immigration offi-
cers to subpoena "witnesses", where pur-
pose of inquiry was to determine whether 
good cause existed to institute denatural-
ization proceedings against such natural-
ized citizens. Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, §§ 101(a) (18), 235(a), 23G 
(a), 242(b), 335, and (b), 336(d;, 340 
(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a) (18), 1225 
(a), 1226(a), 1252(b), 1446, and (b), 
1447(d), 1451(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Witnesses". 
No. 35: 
Mr. Marvin E. Frankel, Washington, 
D. C, for the United States. 
ISO 
Mr. Jacob Kossman, Philadelphia, Pa., 
for respondent Minker. 
No. 47: 
Mr. George Morris Fay, Washington, 
D. C, for Falcone. 
Mr. Marvin E. Frankel, Washington, 
D. C, for respondent Barnes. 
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court. 
[1] Because of conflicting construc-
tions by the Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Third Circuits of § 235(a) 
s^ 0 U.S. 181 UNITED STATES v. MIKKEE 283 
Citeas?6S.Ct 2S1 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act privilege of any person to enter, reenter, 
of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 1CJ$, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ reside in, or pass through the United 
1101 et seq., 1225(a), we brought these States or concerning any matter which 
cases here, 349 U.S. 904, 75 S Ct. 582; is material and relevant to the enforce-
r s U.S. 927, 75 S.Ct. 774. They were merit of this Act and the administration 
heard in sequence, and, since minor dif- of the Service, and to that end may in-
ferences in their facts are irrelevant to voke the aid of any court of the United 
the problems now before us, they may be States." The controlling issue presented 
disposed of in one opinion. 
Section 235(a)1 provides that any im-
migration officer "shall have power to re-
quire by subpena the attendance 
181 
and 
testimony of witnesses before immigra-
by these cases is whether this section 
empowers an immigration officer to sub-
poena a naturalized citizen who is the 
subject of an investigation by the Serv-
ice, where the purpose of the investiga-
tion is to determine if good cause exists 
for the institution of denaturalization 
lion officers * relating to the proceedings under § 340(a) of the Act.: 
I. Section 235(a) in full provides: "The 
inspection, other than the physical and 
mental examination, of aliens (including 
alien crewmen) seeking admission or re-
admission to or the privilege of passing 
through the United States shall be eon-
ducted by immigration officers, except as 
otherwise provided in regard to special 
inquiry officers. All aliens arriving at 
ports of the United States shall be ex-
amined by one or more immigration of-
ficers at the discretion of the Attorney 
General and under such regulations as he 
may prescribe. Immigration officers are 
hereby authorized and empowered to 
board and search any vessel, aircraft, 
railway car, or other conveyance, or ve-
hicle in which they believe aliens are 
being brought into the United States. 
The Attorney General and any immigra-
tion officer, including special inquiry of-
ficers, shall hn\o power to administer 
*>aths and to take and consider evidence 
of or from any person touching the privi-
lege of any alien or person he believes or 
suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, 
pass through, or reside in the United 
States or concerning any matter which 
is material and relevant to the enforce-
ment of this Act and the administra-
tion of the Service, and, where such 
action may be necessary, to make a writ-
ten record of such evidence. Any per-
son coming into the United States may 
be required to state under oath the pur-
pose or purposes for which he comes, the 
length of time he intends to remain in 
the United States, whether or not he 
intends to remain in the United States 
permanently and, if an alien, whether he 
intends to become a citizen thereof, and 
«uch other items of information as will 
aid the immigration officer in determining 
whether he is a national of the United 
States or on alien and, if the latter, 
whether he belongs to any of the ex-
cluded classes enumerated in section 212. 
The Attorney General and any immigra-
tion officer, including special inquiry offi-
cers, shall have power to require by sub-
pena the attendance and testimony of 
witnesses before immigration officers and 
special inquiry officers and the production 
of books, papers, and documents relat-
ing to the privilege of any person to 
enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through 
the United States or concerning any mat-
ter which is materia) and relevant to 
the enforcement of this Act and the ad-
ministration of the Service, and to that 
end may invoke the aid of any court of 
the United States. Any United States 
district court within the jurisdiction of 
which investigations or inquiries are be-
ing conducted by an immigration officer 
or special inquiry officer may, in the 
event of neglect or refusal to respond to 
a subpena issued under this subsection 
or refusal to testily before an immigra-
tion officer or special inquiry officer, is-
sue an order requiring such persons to 
appear before an immigration officer or 
special inquiry officer, produce books, pa-
pers, and documents if demanded, and 
testify, and any failure to obey such or-
der of the court may be punished by the 
court as a contempt thereof." 
2. Section 340(a) provides. "I t shall be 
the duty of the United States district 
attorneys for the respective districts, 
upon affidavit showing good cause there-
for, to institute proceedings in any court 
specified in subsection (a) of section 
o!0 of this title in the judicial district 
in which the naturalized citizen may re-
side at the time of bringing suit, for the 
purpose of revoking and setting aside the 
order admitting such person to citizen-
ship and canceling the certificate of nat-
281 7 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 350 U.S. 
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In No. 35, the District Director of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
at Philadelphia, in accordance with § 
340.11 of the Service's regulations,3 in-
stituted an investigation of respondent 
for the aforementioned purpose. In fur-
therance of this inquiry into the legality 
of 
183 
Minker's naturalization the Director 
subpoenaed him to give testimony at the 
offices of the Service. Prior 'to the re-
quired date of his appearance, he moved 
to quash the subpoena in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania upon the 
ground, inter alia, that it was unauthor-
ized by the Act This motion was denied, 
In re Minker, D.C., 118 F.Supp. 264, and 
no appeal was taken. When respondent 
thereafter failed to obey the subpoena, 
the District Court, on application of the 
^istrict Director, ordered respondent to 
spear before the Service and testify. 
e disregarded this order. After a hear-
ig he was adjudged in contempt for so 
uralization on the ground that such or-
der and certificate of naturalization were 
procured by concealment of a material 
fact or by willful misrepresentation, and 
such revocation and setting aside of the 
order admitting such person to citizen-
ship and such canceling of certificate of 
naturalization shall be effective as of the 
original date of the order and certificate, 
respectively: Provided, That refusal on 
the part of a naturalized citizen within a 
period often years following his naturali-
zation to testify as a witness in any pro-
ceeding before a congressional committee 
concerning his subversive activities, in a 
case where such person has been convict-
ed of contempt for such refusal, shall be 
held to constitute a ground for revocation 
of such person's naturalization under this 
subsection as having been procured by 
concealment of a material fact or by will-
ful misrepresentation. If the naturalized 
citizen does not reside in any judicial dis-
trict in the United States at the time of 
bringing such suit, the proceeding may be 
instituted in the United States Distuct 
Court for the District of Columbia or iu 
the United States district court in the 
judicial district in which such person last 
had his residence." 
doing and fined $500. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit reversed 
holding that while the power to subpoena 
under § 235(a) was available for investi-
gations directed toward denaturalization 
proceedings, respondent as a putative de-
fendant in such a proceeding was not a 
"witness" within the meaning of the 
section, and the Service was, therefore, 
without power to subpoena him.4 217 
F.2d 350. 
In No. 47, each petitioner was served 
with a subpoena issued by the officer in 
charge of the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service at Syracuse, New York. 
The subpoenas commanded petitioners' 
appearance and testimony, and required 
them to produce specified documents. 
They appeared with documents as or-
dered, but refused to be sworn or to tes-
tify. Thereupon an application for an 
order of compliance was made by the 
Service in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of New 
York; but the court, den>ing the Serv-
ice's authority, refused to compel peti-
3. 8 CFK § 340.11 provides: "Investigation 
and report. Whenever it appears that 
any grant of naturalization may have 
been procured by concealment of a ma-
terial fact or by willful misrepresenta-
tion, the facts shall be reported to the 
district director having jurisdiction over 
the naturalized person's last known place 
of residence. If the district director is 
satisfied that a prima facie showing has 
been made that grounds for revocation 
exist, he j-hall cause an investigation to 
be made and report the facts in writing 
to the Commissioner with a recom-
mendation as to whether revocation pro-
ceedings should be instituttd. If it ap-
pears that n iturahzation was procured 
in violation of section 1123 of Title 18 of 
the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1425, the facts in regard thereto may 
be presented bv the district director to 
the appropriate United States Attor-
ney for possible < nminal prosecution " 
4. The question whether respondent was 
required to obey the order of the Dis-
trict Com t inespeetive of that court's 
power under § 235(a) has not been 
raised. See United States v. United Mine 
Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 
S.Ct. 077, 91 L.Ed. 884. 
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give testimony. § 16. But the word "alien? was changed 
to "person," and additional language ex-
tended the subpoena power to "any mat-
ter which is material and relevant to the 
enforcement of this Act and the admin-
istration of the Service." If the addi-
tional clause, following thi portion "re-
the Service's investigation of them un-
der § 340.11 of the regulations. The 
decision assumed, although the court 
did not discuss the question, that each 
petitioner, even though a subject of in-
vestigation, was a "witness" within the 
meaning of § 235(a).6 
[2] This brings us to an examination 
of the scope of § 235(a). It had its gen-
esis in § 16 of the Immigration Act of 
1917, 39 Stat. 874, 885, which dealt with 
the examination of entering aliens by 
the Immigration Service. With respect 
to subpoenas the section provided: "Any 
commissioner of immigration or inspec-
tor in charge shall also have power to re-
Quire by subpoena the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses before said in-
spectors and the production of books, 
papers, and documents touching the 
right of any alien to enter, reenter, re-
aide in, or pass through the United 
States, and to that end may invoke the though § 235(a) is itself 
the United States 
Obviously, this provision 
strictly defined the purposes for which 
^cers of the Service could subpoena 
witnesses. It did not give them power 
to issue subpoenas as aids in investigat-
lr
*g potential naturalization offenses. 
$50 U.S. 185 
tioners to appear and 
Application of Barnes, D.C., 116 F. 
Supp. 464. On appeal, to the Court of 
184 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, this 
judgment was reversed. 219 F.2d 137. 
The court held that § 235(a) of the Act 
permitted the immigration officer to sub-
 l a t i n g t o t h e privilege" of U y person to 
poena the petitioners in furtherance of
 e n t e r < r e e n t e r , reside in, orl pass through 
the United States", had merely read 
"and any other matter which is material 
and 
185 
relevant/' the doctrinle of ejusdem 
generis would appropriately be invoked 
to limit the subpoena power to an in-
vestigation pertaining to questions of 
admission and deportation. The com-
prehensive addition of the clause "or 
concerning any matter wh ip is material 
and relevant to the enforcement of this 
Act and the administration of the Serv-
ice*', precludes such narrowing reading. 
"Act" encompasses the full range of 
subjects covered by the itatute. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 brought together in one statute the 
previously atomized subjects of immi-
gration, nationality and daturalization. 
The unqualified use of thi word "Act" 
in § 235(a), if read as ordinary English, 
embraces all of these subjects even 
in the immi-
gration title of the statutle. But "the 
title of a statute and the sheading of a 
section cannot limit the plain meaning 
• * # » Brotherhood | of Railroad 
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co,, 
331 U.S. 519, 528-529, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 
1391-1392, 91 L.Ed. 1G46. Throughout 
this statute the word "Actr is given its 
full significance. The weird embraces 
the entire statute.6 On the other hand, 
aid of any court of 
* * # >» 
13,4] The 1952 Act in § 235(a) re-
tained the substance of this language in 
5
- The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has taken the same vi< w. Lan-
feiy v. Savoretti, 220 F.2d 000. 
S
 E. g., § 215(g) : "Passports, visas, re-
entry permits, and other documents re-
quired for entry under this Act may be 
considered as permits to enter for the 
purposes of this section/' Section 211 
(**) (2) : "Any alien in the United 
States * * * shall, upon the order 
°f the Attorney General, be dt ported 
who—* * • entered the United States 
without inspection or at 
place other than as design 
Attorney General or is m 
States in \iolation of this Al 
lation of any oih*r law of| 
State* ' Section 290 fi) : 
be established in the office of 
sinner, for the use of the sec 
fureement agencies of the Go| 
the United States, a central 
bhali contain the names of all 
tofure admitted to the Unitejd 
riny time or 
luted by the 
the United 
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when 
186 
only a particular title is referred 
to, it is designated as such, and when 
the reference is to a section, that word 
is employed.7 No justification appears 
for treating "Act" in § 235(a) as mean-
ing "section," Thus far the Second and 
Third Circuits are in agreement. 
[5, 6] We come then to the question 
upon which the two Courts of Appeals 
part ways in their construction of § 235 
(a), namely, whether Salvatore and Jo-
seph Falcone in the one case and Abra-
ham Minker in the other, although each 
the subject of a denaturalization inves-
tigation under § 340.11 of the regula-
tions, were "witnesses" within the 
meaning of the power given to "any im-
migration officer" to require "by subpoe-
na the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses" before immigration officers. 
If the answer to the question merely 
depended upon whether, as a matter of 
allowable English usage, the word "wit-
ness" may fairly describe a person in 
the position of Minker and the Falcones, 
it could not be denied that the word 
could as readily be deemed to cover 
persons in their position as not. In 
short, the word is patently ambiguous: 
it can fairly be applied to anyone who 
gives testimony in a proceeding, al-
though the proceeding immediately or 
potentially involves him as a party, or 
it may be restricted to the person who 
gives testimony in another's case. 
187 
It is pertinent to note the breadth of 
§ 235(a) not only with respect to the 
excluded therefrom, insofar as such in-
formation is available from the existing 
records of the Service, and the names of 
all aliens hereafter admitted to the Unit-
ed States, or excluded therefrom, the 
names of their sponsors of record, if any, 
and such other relevant information as 
the Attorney General tdinll require as an 
aid to the proper enforcement of t<his 
Act." 
7. E. g., § 284: "Nothing contained in 
this title shall be construed so as to 
limit, rest! ict, deny, or affect the com-
ing into or departure from the United 
type of investigation in which a subpoe-
na may be issued ("any matter which 
'
e d
 is material and relevant to the enforce-
e n
 ment of this Act"), but also with respect 
>r(i
 to the member of the Service empowered 
i r s
 to issue it. The power is granted "any 
m
~ immigration officer," who in turn is de-
n d
 fined in § 101(a) (18) of the Act as 
"any employee or class of employees of 
o n the Service or of the United States des-
a ] s ignated by the Attorney General, indi-
»35 vidually or by regulation, to perform the 
r0„ functions of an immigration officer spec-
r a . ified by this Act or any section there-
ch of." This extensive delegated authority 
es_ reinforces the considerations inherent in 
Ia„ the nature of the power sought to be ex-
he ercised that make for a restrictive read-
in- *n£ °^ tt*e Janus-faced word "witness." 
De_ The subpoena power "is a power capable 
it- °* oppressive use, especially when it may 
be indiscriminately delegated and the 
subpoena is not returnable before a ju-
*
[y
 dicial officer. * * * True, there can 
,° be no penalty incurred for contempt be-
\" fore there is a judicial order of enforce-
m
 ment. But the subpoena is in foim an 
e s
' official command, and even though im-
>r
 providently issued it has some coercive 
^ tendency, either because of ignorance of 
n
 their rights on the part of those whom 
|j** it purports to command or their natural 
0
 respect for what appears to be an official 
command, or because of their reluctance 
to test the subpoena's validity by litiga-
°
r
 tion," Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Hol-
0
 land, 315 U.S. 357, 3(33-364, 62 S.Ct. 651, 
654 655, 86 L.Ed. 895. 
These concerns, relevant to the con-
li  struction of this ambiguously worded 
States of an alien member of the Arm^d 
Forces of the United States who is in 
the uniform of, or who bears documents 
identifying him as a member of, such 
Armed Forces, and who is coming to or 
departing from the I nited States under 
oifici.il orders or permit of such Armed 
Forces : ProvnUd, That nothing con-
tained in this section shall be construed 
to give to or confer upon any such alien 
any other privileges, rights, benefits, ex-
emptions, or immunities under this Act, 
which are not otherwise specifically 
granted by this Act." 
$50 U.S. 189 UNITED STATES v. MINKEE 287 
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power, are emphatically pertinent to in- consequences to prospective defendants 
vestigations that constitute the first step 
in proceedings calculated to bring about 
the denaturalization of citizens. See 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 
118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L,Ed. 1796; Baum-
gartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 
64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525. This may 
result in "loss of both property and 
life, or of all that makes life worth liv-
ing/' Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 
276, 
188 
284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed. 938. 
In such a situation where there is doubt 
it must be resolved in the citizen's fa-
vor. Especially must we be sensitive to 
the citizen's rights where the proceed-
ing is nonjudicial because of "[t]he 
difference in security of judicial over 
administrative action # * V Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, supra, 259 U.S. at 
page 285, 42 S.Ct. at page 495. 
These considerations of policy, which 
determined the Court's decisions in re-
quiring judicial as against administra-
tive adjudication of the issue of citizen-
ship in a deportation proceeding and 
those defining the heavy criterion of 
proof to be exacted by the lower courts 
from the Government before decreeing 
denaturalization, are important guides 
in reaching decision here. They give 
coherence to law and are fairly to be 
assumed as congressional presupposi-
tions, unless by appropriate explicitness 
the lawmakers make them inapplicable. 
Cf. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 
83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622. It does not be-
speak depreciation of official zeal, nor 
^oes it bring into question disinterested-
ness, to conclude that compulsory ex 
+zrte administrative examinations, un-
trammelled by the safeguards of a pub-
^e adversary judicial proceeding, afford 
to<> ready opportunities for unhappy 
• 
8
- "While the Nationality Act [§ 333(a) 
°f the 1940 Act] provides for subpena of 
witnesses at a preliminary [naturaliza-
tion] hearing and for calling of witnesses 
*a any naturalization proceedings in 
court, specific provision is not made for 
•unpenning the petitioner. The subcom-
mittee feels that the proposed bill should 
in denaturalization suits. 
These general considerations find spe-
cific reinforcement in the language of 
other provisions of the Act, wherein the 
person who is the subject of an investi-
gation is referred to with particularity. 
The most striking example of this is to 
be found in § 335 and its legislative his-
tory which pertains to the investigation 
of an alien who petitions for naturaliza-
tion. Section 335(b) provides: "The 
Attorney General shall designate em-
ployees of the Service to conduct pre-
liminary examinations upon petitions 
for naturalization * * *. For such 
purposes any such employee so designat-
ed is hereby authorized to take testi-
mony concerning any matter touching 
or in any way affecting the admissibility 
of any petitioner for naturalization, 
189 
to 
administer oaths, including the oaths of 
the petitioner for naturalization and the 
oaths of petitioner's witnesses to the 
petition for naturalization, and to re-
quire by subpena the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses, including peti-
tioner * * *." Contrast this with 
§ 335(b)'s predecessor, § 333(a) of the 
Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 
1156: "* # # any such designated 
examiner is hereby authorized to take 
testimony concerning any matter touch-
ing or in any way affecting the admis-
sibility of any petitioner for naturaliza-
tion, to subpena witnesses, and to ad-
minister oaths, including the oath of the 
petitioner to the petition for naturaliza-
tion and the oath of petitioner's witness-
es/ ' 8 Other examples of Congress' care-
ful differentiation between a witness 
who is not the subject of an investiga-
tion and the person who is, may be 
found in §§ 236(a),9 242(b)10 and 336 
contain the requirement that the peti-
tioner be required to attend hearings and 
is so recommending." S.Iiep. No. 1515, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 739. 
9. Section 236(a) provides: "A special in-
quiry officer shall conduct proceedings 
10. See note 10 on page 288. 
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( d ^ o f the 1952 Act. 
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All these considerations converge to 
the conclusion that Congress has not 
provided with sufficient clarity that the 
subpoena power granted by § 235(a) ex-
tends over persons who are the subject 
of denaturalization investigations; 
therefore Congress is not to be deemed 
to have done so impliedly. Since this is 
so, we are not called "upon to consider 
whether Congress may empower an im-
migration officer to secure evidence, un-
der the authority of a subpoena, from a 
citizen who is himself the subject of an 
investigation directed toward his denat-
uralization. The judgment in No. 35 is 
affirmed; in No. 47, the judgment is 
reversed. 
Affirmed and reversed respectively. 
Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring. 
The respondent Minker is a natural-
ized citizen of the United States.1 He 
was subpoenaed by an immigration offi-
cer to appear and give testimony as a 
"witness." But Minker was not to be 
a witness within the traditional meaning 
of that word, that is, one who testifies 
in a court proceeding or in a public 
quasi-judicial hearing of some kind. The 
immigration officer summoning Minker 
under this section, administer oaths, 
present and receive evidence, and inter-
rogate, examine, and cross-examine the 
alien or witnesses." 
10. Section 242(b) provides: "A special 
inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings 
under this section to determine the de-
portability of any alien, and shall ad-
minister oaths, present and receive evi-
dence, interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine the alien or witnesses, and, as 
authorized by the Attorney General, shall 
make determinations, including orders of 
deportation." 
11. Section 836(d) provides: ' T h e Attor-
ney General shall have the right tb ap-
pear before any court in any naturaliza-
tion proceedings for the purpose of 
cross-examining the petitioner and the 
witnesses produced in support of the pe-
tition concerning any matter touching or 
in any way affecting the petitioner's right 
was not a judge or "grand jury" of any 
kind, nor was he at the time acting in 
any quasi-judicial capacity. Cf. In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L. 
Ed. 682. He was acting under his broad 
power as a law enforcement officer to 
follow up clues and find information that 
might be useful in later civil or criminal 
prosecutions brought against persons 
suspected 
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of violating the immigration 
and naturalization laws. See, e. g., § 
287, Immigration and Nationality Act, 
66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357, 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1357; 8 CFR §§ 287.1-287.5. The 
object in summoning Minker was to in-
terrogate him in the immigration offi-
cer's private chambers to try to elicit 
information "relating to the possible in-
stitution of proceedings seeking the rev-
ocation of * # # [Minker's] natural-
ization. # * *" Information so ob-
tained might be used under some cir-
cumstances in court to take away Mil-
ker's American citizenship or convict 
him of perjury or some other crime.2 
Thus the capacity in which this immi-
gration officer was acting was precisely 
the same as that of a policeman, con-
stable, sheriff, or Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation agent who interrogates a 
person, perhaps himself a suspect, in 
connection with murder or some other 
to admission to citizenship, and shall 
have the right to call witnesses, includ-
ing the petitioner, produce evidence, and 
be heard in opposition to, or in favor 
of, the granting of any petition in nat-
uralization proceedings." 
1. Minker is respondent in No. 35. He 
and the petitioners in No. 47, Salvatore 
and Joseph Falcone, raise the same ques-
tions, and what 1 say about Minker's case 
applies also to that of the Fulcoues. 
2. See § 348, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. § 1459, 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1450; 18 U.S.C. § 1621, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1621. See also Gonzales v. 
Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 2.10, re-
versing 9 Cir., 215 F.2d 955. But see 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 
S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; majority and 
dissenting opinions in Feidman v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 88 
L.Ed. 1408; Adams v. Maryland, 347 
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crime. Apparently Congress has never tion matters. 
even attempted to vest FBI agents with 
such private inquisitorial power. In-
deed, this Court has construed congres-
sional enactments as designed to safe-
guard persons against compulsory ques-
tioning by law enforcement officers be-
hind closed doors. McNabb v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L. 
Ed. 819; Upshaw v. United States, 335 
U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100. 
And we have frequently set aside state 
criminal convictions as a denial of due 
process of law because of coercive ques-
tioning of suspects by public prosecutors 
and other law enforcement officers in 
their official chambers. See, e. g., Watts 
v, Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct, 1347, 
93 LEd. 1801; Harris v. South Caro-
lina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct, 1354, 93 L.Ed. 
1815; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 
227, 60 S.Ct 472, 84 L.Ed. 716. Yet 
power of the Attorney General and im-
migration officers to compel persons, in-
cluding suspects, to appear and subject 
themselves 
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For this reason I concur 
in the Court's judgment in £his case. 
The Department of Justice finds the 
sweeping power it claims in § 235 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952, 66 Stat. 163, 198, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 
1225, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1225. That 
Act is a comprehensive codification of 
laws relating to entry, exclusion, domes-
tic control, deportation and naturaliza-
tion of aliens; the Act also provides the 
controlling rules and procedures for de-
naturalizing naturalized citizens. Pri-
mary responsibility for administration 
and enforcement of the Act is vested in 
the Attorney General, acting chiefly 
through his subordinates in the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service. 8 
103, 66 S ta t 173, 8 U.S.C. § 1103, 8 U.S. 
C.A. § 1103. 
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to questioning by law en-
forcement officers in their private cham-
bers is precisely what the Department of 
Justice claims here. This is no less true 
because a federal judge must be called 
°n to "aid" the immigration officer in 
subjecting a summoned person to ques-
tioning. § 235(a), 66 S ta t 198, 8 U.S. 
c
- § 1225(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a). For 
after a court order, as before, the per-
son summoned must go to an immigra-
tion officer's private chambers for ques-
tioning by him, out of which may come 
a
 Prosecution against the "witness" for 
Perjury or some other crime. A purpose 
t o
 subject aliens, much less citizens, to 
a
 Police practice so dangerous to indi-
ytoual liberty as this should not be read 
This Court has drawn sharp and high-
ly important distinctions between the 
constitutional power of Congress to bar 
and exclude aliens and congressional 
power to strip 
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citizens of their citizen-
ship. Former cases have held that Con-
gress has full power to bar or exclude 
aliens from the country. See, e. g., Unit-
ed States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 
S.Ct 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040; Harisiades v, 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 
96 L.Ed. 586; Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S. 
Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956. But citizenship, 
whether acquired by birth or by natural-
ization, cannot be taken away without a 
judicial trial in which the Government 
carries a heavy burden. Se£, e. g., Ng 
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S. 
Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938; Baumgartner v. 
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 
1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525; Gonzales v. Lan-
mto an Act of Congress in the absence don, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210. Con-
°* a clear and unequivocal congressional gress, apparently taking note of these 
j&andate. I think the Act relied on here * basic distinctions, divided tt\e Act into 
oy the Department of Justice should not different "Titles" and "Chapters." Sec-
e
 so read, I would hold that immigra- tion 235, on which the Government re-
*
on
 officers are wholly without statu- lies here, appears in Chapter IV of Title 
r>f authority to summon persons, II. Title II as a whole contains provi-
'ether suspects or not, to testify in sions relating to "Immigration" and 
v a t e a s
 "witnesses" in denaturaliza- Chapter IV of that Title contains the 
W S.Ct.—1» 
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"Provisions Relating to Entry and Ex-
clusion/' It is in the context of Chap-
ter IV that § 235 gives the Attorney 
General and immigration officers, "in-
cluding special inquiry officers", broad 
power to subpoena and require testi-
mony of "witnesses" as to "the privilege 
of any person to enter, reenter, reside 
in, or pass through the United States or 
concerning any matter which is material 
and relevant to the enforcement of this 
Act and the administration of the Serv-
ice * * *." I think that context in-
dicates that § 235 was designed to apply 
only to the examination of "witnesses" 
by immigration officers in relation to 
"entry and exclusion" of aliens, and 
matters material and relevant to entry 
and exclusion. Such a reading makes 
the subpoena power given fit into the 
carefully devised pattern of Title II, 
which deals with aliens and immigra-
tion, not with naturalization or denat-
uralization. Even if limited to matters 
pertaining to the entry and exclusion 
of aliens, compulsory private examina-
tion of "witnesses" might be invalid. 
The broad powers here claimed by the 
194 
Attorney General and his immigration 
officers could be more nearly defended, 
if they can be defended at all, by con-
fining use of the powers to the field of 
treatment of aliens, where this Court 
has said Congress has most power. 
Limitation of the subpoena and inves-
tigatory powers in § 235 to matters re-
lating to entry, control and exclusion of 
aliens is strengthened by consideration 
of Title III of the Act which covers 
3. The Attorney General's regulations for 
the conduct of these examinations, 8 
CFIi §§ 335.11~S35.1S, also provide that 
the petitioner for naturalization may be 
represented by counsel and that the pe-
titioner may cross-examine government 
witnesses. If petitioner is not repre-
sented by counsel, the hearing examiner 
must assist him in introducing his evi- ' 
dence. Furthermore the decision of the 
examiner may not be based on evidence 
which is not in the record or which 
would be inadmissible in judicial proceed-
ings. Thus the regulations emphasize 
"Nationality and Naturalization." That 
Title provides procedures for investiga-
tion and trial of naturalization and de-
naturalization cases, wholly adequate in 
themselves without reliance on the sub-
poena and examination powers of immi-
gration officers under § 235. The nat-
uralization and denaturalization proce-
dures of Title III are not merely ade-
quate, but are in a measure inconsistent 
with § 235 procedure. Looking first at 
naturalization procedure under §§ 332-
336, 66 Stat. 252-258, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1443-
1447, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1443-1447, it ap-
pears that Congress with meticulous 
care provided a procedure for investiga-
tion of naturalization cases. These sec-
tions provide their own way for sum-
moning and examining witnesses, With-
out mentioning immigration officers, the 
sections provide for investigations, etc., 
to be carried on by any employee of the 
Service or of the United States designat-
ed by the Attorney General. An exam-
ination under this Title is carried on by 
a public hearing at which an applicant 
for citizenship can produce his own wit-
nesses.3 The designated 
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hearing exam-
iner is given the power to subpoena wit-
nesses by § 335(b), 66 Stat. 255, 8 U.S. 
C. § 1446(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b), and 
the naturalization judge is authorized 
to compel compliance with the subpoena. 
After the hearing the examiner reports 
his findings and recommendations to the 
Attorney General. The views of the 
designated examiner, and of the Attor-
ney General if in conflict, are then re-
ported to the naturalization court for its 
the difference between a subpoena to tes-
tify before a § 335 naturalization hear-
ing officer and a subpoena to testify be-
fore a § 235 immigration officer seeking 
to obtain evidence for criminal prosecu-
tion or deportation. And they show that 
naturalization procedures are completely 
independent from entry and exclusion 
procedures. Cf. §§ 235(c), 230(a), 202, 
66 Stat. 199, 200, 235, 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 
(c), 1220(a), 1362, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225 
(c), 1226(a), 1362; 8 CFR §§ 235.15, 
236.11-236.16. 
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consideration. All of 
me that reliance on the subpoena and 
private examination powers of immigra-
tion officers under § 235 would actually 
conflict with the public hearing proce-
dure Congress and the Attorney Gen-
eral have provided for naturalization 
cases in §§ 332-335, 66 Stat. 252-257, 
8 US.C. §§ 1443-1446, 8 US.C.A. §§ 
1443-1446, and 8 CFR §§ 335 11-335.13. 
It seems even clearer that immigra-
tion officers' powers under § 235 are not 
applicable in denaturalization cases. Sec-
tion 340 of Title III of the Act, 66 Stat. 
260, 8 U.S.C. § 1451, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451, 
provides for revocation of naturaliza-
tion. Responsibility for initiating such 
cases is placed on district attorneys "up-
on affidavit showing good cause there-
for * * •." Many of the grounds for 
denaturalization are aba grounds for 
felony prosecutions. Under these cir-
cumstances it is not surprising that 
Congress expressly placed responsibility 
for instituting denaturalization proceed-
ings on district attorneys, leaving them 
to summon persons to appear as witness-
es in the traditional manner before 
grand juries or courts. It would have 
been surprising had Congress attempted 
to authorize the Nation's chief prosecut-
ing officer and his subordinates to com-
pel a citizen to appear in go\ernment 
private offices to 
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answer questions in 
secret about that citizen's conduct, asso-
ciations and beliefs. Some countries 
£ive such powers to their officials. It 
is to be hoped that this country never 
will. 
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this persuades Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401. Congress has 
provided a special judicial procedure 
which must be followed, if a citizen is 
denaturalized. That procedure is con-
tained in § 340 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 163, 
8 IKSC. § 1451, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1451. It 
provides for canceling a certificate of 
naturalization on the ground that it was 
procured "by concealment of a material 
fact or by willful misrepresentation." 
§ 340(a). Suit may be brought by the 
United States Attorney in the District 
Court "upon affidavit showing good 
cause." Id. The citizen whose citizen-
ship is challenged has 60 days "in wiiieh 
to make answers to the petition of the 
United States." § 340(b). There is no 
pretrial administrative procedure pro-
vided in the section governing denatu-
ralization. One can search § 340 in vain 
for any suggestion that the judicial pro-
cedure is supplemented by a pretrial 
procedure. So to hold would make the 
60-day period for answer "empty 
words," as Judge Foley ruled in Appli-
cation of Barnes, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 464, 
469, As Judge Hastie, writing for the 
court below m the Minker case, said, 
the administrative pretrial procedure is 
not consistent with the safeguards 
which Congress has provided in the ju-
dicial proceedings. 3 Cir., 217 F.2d 350, 
352. I agree with that view and would, 
therefore, read 
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§ 235(a) to exclude wit-
nesses who are potential defendants in 
§ 340 cases. , 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. 
While I agree with the result reached 
by the Court, I do not think this case 
*s comparable to those controversies that 
frequently rage over the scope of the 
^vestigative power in support of ad-
ministrative action, Cf. Cudahy Pack-
l
n Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S. 
Ct. 651, 86 L.Ed 895 with United States 
v
- Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S. 
Ther^ is another reason for reading 
the section narrowly. When we deal 
with citizenship wre tread on sensitive 
ground. The citizenship of a naturalized 
person has the same dignity and status 
as the citizenship of those of us born 
here, save only for eligibility to the 
Presidency. Pie is a member of a com-
munity included within the protection 
of all the guarantees of the Constitution. 
Those safeguards would be imperiled if 
prior to the institution of the proceed-
ings the citizen could be compelled to be 
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a witness against himself and furnish 
out of his own mouth the evidence used 
to denaturalize him. I would require 
the Government to proceed with meticu-
lous regard for the basic notions of Due 
Process which protect every vital right 
of the American citizen. 
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Dantan George REA, Petitioner, 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America, 
No. 30. 
Argued Nov. 10, 1955. 
Decided Jan. 16, 1956. 
Proceeding to enjoin federal narcot-
ics agent from testifying in state court 
prosecution with respect to narcotics 
which were obtained by agent in course 
of illegal search and wiiich were sup-
pressed in federal prosecution. The 
United States District Court for the 
District of New Mexico denied relief 
sought, and movant appealed. The Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, 218 F.2d 237, affirmed 
the order, and movant obtained certiora-
ri. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice 
Douglas, held that agent was subject 
to injunction. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice 
Reed, Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice 
Minton dissented. 
]L Criminal Law $=»1221 
Evidence which was received to sup-
port charge of unlawful acquisition of 
marihuana in violation of Internal Rev-
enue Code was "contraband", and not re-
pleviable. 26 U.S.C.A. (LR.C.1939) §§ 
2593(a), 2598, 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Contraband". 
2. Courts 0^383(1) 
Certiorari was granted to review re-
fusal to enjoin federal narcotics agent 
from testifying in state criminal prose-
cution with respect to narcotics obtained 
in illegal search, because of the impor-
tance in federal law eniorcement of the 
question presented. 
3. Courts C=>383(1) 
Question whether a federal agent 
who had obtained narcotics under an al-
legedly invalid search warrant should be 
enjoined by a federal court from testi-
fying in a state court prosecution con-
cerning the evidence seized did not raise 
a constitutional question, but one con-
cerning the Supreme Court's supervisory 
powers over federal law enforcement 
agencies. 
4. Searches and Seizures C^3(l) 
The power of federal courts extends 
to policing Federal Rules governing 
searches and seizures, and making cer-
tain that they are observed. 
5. Courts <&=>257 
Federal courts sit to enforce federal 
law, including the process issuing irom 
those courts. 
6. Criminal Law C=>394 
A federal agent, in obtaining evi-
dence for federal prosecution, is obliged 
to obey the Federal Rules relating to 
searches and seizures. Fed.Rules Crim. 
Proc. rule 41 (a, c), 18 U.S.C.A. 
7. Courts <S==>262.6(5) 
Where federal narcotics agent ob-
tained evidence, for federal prosecution, 
in course of illegal search and seizure, 
and evidence was suppressed in federal 
court, federal agent was subject to in-
junction to prevent him from testifying 
concerning the evidence in a state court 
prosecution. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc, rule 
41(a, c, e), 18 U.S.C.A.; 26 U.S.C.A. 
(LR.C.1939) §§ 2593(a), 2598; 28 U.S. 
C.A. § 2463; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4. 
Mr. Joseph A. Sommer, for petitioner. 
Mrs. Beatrice Rosenberg, Washing-
ton, D. C, for respondent. 
